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WINNING MEDICINE: PROFESSIONAL SPORTS
TEAM DOCTORS' CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST
If a doctor becomes too conservative with the players, he won't
be around long. No team wants its players coddled. They pay big
money and expect players to swallow their fair share of pain. If
this in course leads to permanent injury, again the thinking goes,
that's what players get paid for.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Our society expects physicians always to act according to what is best
for their patients.2 When the patients are professional athletes, however,
doctor; often will encounter severe pressures from their employers, the
patients, and from their own self-interests to compromise their medical
ethics.-' First and foremost, team doctors are pressured by their employ-
ers. Professional sports is big business in the United States.4 Winning
1. TIM GREEN, THE DARK SIDE OF THE GAME 215 (1996).
2. See, MARC C. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MORALS: PHYSICIANS' CON-
FLIC S OF INTEREST 268 (1993) (citing Hippocrates). The Hippocratic oath by which all
American doctors swear says:
I will use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and judgment but
never with a view to wrong-doing.... Into whatever house I enter, I will enter to
help the sick, and I will abstain from all intentional wrong-doings and harm, espe-
cially from abusing the bodies of man or woman....
Id.
More applicable to the team physician example is the ethical principle that a "physician
should not dispose of his services under terms or conditions which tend to interfere with or
impair t ae free and complete exercise of medical judgment and skill or tend to cause a
deterioration of the quality of medical care." AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCI-
PLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 6 (1957).
3. See infra notes 71-141 and accompanying text.
4. For example, the 107 franchises in professional football, baseball, basketball, and
hockey approximately are worth a combined $11.4 billion. The Business of Sports, 5 CQ
RESEARCHER, 121, 121 (1995); Franchise values have exceeded $300 million per team.
Sam Ward, Ballyard Sale, USA TODAY, March 20, 1998, at 17C. The National Football
League ("NFL") collected $17.6 billion in its most recent three year television agreement.
Leonard Shapiro & Paul Farhi, ABC Keeps Mondays in Record NFL Deals; Networks Pay
$17.6 Billion; NBC Out, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1998, at Al; Some National Basketball Asso-
ciation ("NBA") players have signed contracts in excess of $100 million. E.g., Garnett: Six
Years, $120 Million, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1997, at E6.
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games triggers increased ticket sales, television viewership, and merchan-
dise sales.5 Team physicians, often considered part of the team, indirectly
can cause a team to lose by properly asserting that a star player physically
is unable to perform. Management may work years if not decades for a
chance to go to the playoffs or win a title, consequently, owners will not
tolerate a team doctor who is so cautious that it causes the team to lose.6
Second, athletes also pressure team physicians to compromise medical
ethics. Athletes themselves feel pressure to perform on the field for eco-
nomic reasons as well as for reasons of pride, peer pressure, and the love
of the game.7
Third, the team physician faces self-imposed pressures to compromise
his medical ethics. The association with a professional sports team can
result in a substantial amount of business and prestige for the team doc-
tor.' He benefits from the publicity of his position with the team, but does
not want the notoriety that would accompany his being fired. Conse-
quently, because all doctors owe their primary duty to their patients,9 the
team doctor is burdened by constantly having to ignore these pressures in
order to make ethical medical decisions.
Management urges or coerces athletes to take long-term risks to make
short-term gains for teams.1" The physician's ethics may place him in con-
flict with the team's values when he believes that an athlete's health is in
danger. The doctor must not allow outside pressure to influence his deci-
5. See, e.g., Chris Haft, Team's New Look Sells but Winning Means even More Buy-
ing, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Mar. 10, 1997, at B5. The 1997 Super Bowl champion Green
Bay Packers enjoyed a dramatic rise in merchandise sales despite changing nothing about
the team apparel that is sold. Ranking 20th in the NFL in sales in 1992, the year coach
Mike Holmgren and Brett Favre, their quarterback, arrived, the Packers rose to 13th in
1993, which coincided with All-Pro defensive end Reggie White's joining the team. They
also reached the playoffs that year for the first time since 1982. As the team improved, so
did sales to 8th in the league in 1994, 5th in 1995, and 2nd in 1996, a season when the
Packers won the Super Bowl. Id. Note that NFL teams, unlike some other leagues, share
merchandising revenue, Id., but that is unrelated to the correlation between sales and
winning.
6. See e.g., Ron Pollack, Are Injured Players on Their Own?, PRO FOOTBALL WKLY,
Nov. 10, 1996, at 12. When a head coach "turns up the heat", one former player who still is
closely connected to the NFL stated that "A lot of times [the team physician] folds. The
ones that don't fold end up being fired." Id.
7. See infra notes 75-97 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 119-141 and accompanying text.
9. See RODWIN supra note 2.
10. Thomas H. Murry, Divided Loyalties in Sports Medicine, THE PHYSICIAN AND
SPORTS MEDICINE, Aug. 1984, at 136 (explaining that it is management's inherent interest
in winning that tempts management to coerce athletes to take risks which may have long
term health consequences).
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sions. It is not easy to make clear judgments, however, when an em-
ployer is telling the doctor, an employee, to get the players ready to play
as quickly as possible, the player is telling the doctor to get him back into
play as quickly as: possible, and the media and the fans want the player to
play as quickly as possible. These outside pressures gain even more
strength when combined with the fact that the team physician personally
may fe-l as much pressure to win as anyone associated with the team."
Unfortunately for the team doctors, few guidelines exist concerning
how to deal with the conflict between the pressures to win and the stan-
dards of medical ethics. Certainly, the American Medical Association
("AMA") has stated that the interests of the patient, here the athlete,
should be paramount in the practice of medicine.' 2 Similarly, the World
Medical Association ("WMA") has established rules which state that the
health of patients must be the first consideration' 3 and that a "doctor
owes to his patient complete loyalty."' 4 Legal standards for all specialties
recognized by the AMA have been established, but the AMA has not
recognized sports medicine or the team physician role as a specialty or
subspecialty."5 However, the American College of Sports Medicine has
established some guidelines. 6 Those guidelines only say that when con-
fronted by pressures from coaches and athletes, the team physician has
the obligation to put those pressures aside when providing treatment.' 7
The guidelines do not address how to do so or where to draw the line.' 8
For example, what does a team doctor do when he thinks that a player
should not play, but that player is adamant that he is capable of playing?
That player could be lying or concealing information, perhaps because
the owner has threatened or might threaten his job. It even might be
unclear whether or not that athlete is lucid enough to make a decision
11. See infra notes 119-141 and accompanying text.
12. ]RODWIN, supra note 2, at 41-42 (citing AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION COUN-
CIL ON ETHICAL AFFAIRS. CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND JUDI-
CIAL AFFAIRS 56 (1989)).
13. RODWIN, supra note 2, at 268 (citing 1 WORLD MED. A'SSN J. 109-11 (1949)).
14. d. at 269.
15. ]ELIZABETH M. GALLUP, LAW AND THE TEAM PHYSICIAN 9 (1995) (citing to the
AMERICAN BOARD OF MEDICAL SPECIALTIES ANNUAL REPORT 6-7).
16. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF SPORT MEDICINE'S GUIDELINES FOR THE TEAM PHYSI-
CIAN, (Robert C. Cantu & Lyle J. Mitcheli eds. 1991) [hereinafter "ACSM"]. This source
provides general guidelines for team physicians at all levels. Different team physicians have
varied duties depending upon the team and the sport. Therefore, the ACSM guideline will
be only one source in a mix of sources that may be used to determine the standard of care
for a particular team doctor. GALLUP, supra note 15, at 10.
17. ACSM, supra note 16, at 123-24.
18.d.
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concerning his present and future health. What if that athlete is essential
for the team to make the playoffs, and the doctor is a lifelong fan or could
really use playoff bonus money to help support his family?
The purpose of this Comment is to demonstrate to both physicians and
attorneys that legal conflicts of interest exist for team physicians. First,
this Comment explains the legal standard of care as it now exists for team
doctors. Second, the pressures that team doctors face, which create con-
flicts of interest for them, are fully examined. These overwhelming pres-
sures demonstrate how difficult it can be for a team physician to maintain
clear, unbiased judgment when having to treat professional athletes.
Third, this Comment presents the case law background which will demon-
strate both how these pressures have resulted in team doctor liability and
what has been found to be liable conduct in the past. Finally, this Com-
ment reveals and analyzes solutions to the possible conflicts of interest
facing team physicians both by demonstrating some ways that team doc-
tors can protect themselves and ways that negative pressures that these
doctors face can be decreased.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A physician has a conflict of interest when competing interests or com-
mitments compromise his independent judgment.19 These conflicts can
motivate doctors to act in ways that may not favor patients.2" Conflicts of
interest may increase the risk that physicians will abuse their patients'
trust.2 Yet, conflicts of interest are not "acts" and they do not ensure
disloyalty to the patient.22 In order to recover for medical malpractice a
plaintiff must establish the following elements: 1) a duty owed to the
plaintiff based upon the doctor-patient relationship;23 2) a breach of the
standard of care;24 3) an injury;25 and 4) a causal connection between
the breach and the injury.26
Due to the variety of arrangements reached with physicians to provide
19. RODWIN, supra note 2, at 9.
20. Id. at 8-9.
21. Id. at 9.
22. Id.
23. Charles V. Russell, Legal and Ethical Conflicts Arising from the Team Physician's
Dual Obligation to the Athlete and Management, 10 SETON HALL LEGIS J. 299, 301 (1987)





medical care to athletes, a team physician is not precisely defined.27 One
attempt defines such a doctor as "a physician who undertakes to render
medical services to athletic participants and whose services are either ar-
ranged for or paid for at least in part by the institution or entity other
than the patient, the patient's family, or some surrogate., 28 Since these
physicians have no duty to enter into this contractual relationship,29 the
doctor-patient relationship is deemed consensual.3" Regardless of the
original purpose of the examination, the goals and expectations of the
patient, or the party paying the physician, a team physician always owes
his patients a duty not to inflict injury by some misfeasance. 3' There is
also a general duty to take the necessary action and exercise reasonable
care to prevent harm, or further harm, to the patient. 32 This duty is cre-
ated either contractually through the third-party beneficiary theory3 3 or
through'i tort theory which imposes a duty of due care upon anyone who
begins to undertake to perform services for another's benefit.34 How-
ever, it is not necessary for compensation to be intended, from any
source, in order for there to be a duty imposed upon the doctor.35
When a physician's purpose is care and treatment of a patient, the phy-
sician intends to establish a doctor-patient relationship and a duty of due
care owed to the patient will always be found. 36 But, when a physician
examines a patient for the sole purpose of gaining information for a third
party, it is unclear whether a duty of care is owed to the patient.37 The
traditional view is that unless the examination has a therapeutic purpose,
27. Joseph H. King Jr., The Duty and Standard of Care for Team Physicians, 18 Hous.
L. REv. 557, 658 (1981).
28. id.
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965) (A private physician has no duty
to enter into a relationship that would create a duty of care.).
30. King, supra note 27, at 661.
31. Id. at 663.
32. Id.
33. See generally, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 133, 135, 139 (1973)
(standing for the principle that contracts create a duty, but liability for the breach of that
duty resulting in a personal injury will usually fall under the scope of tort law).
34. See generally, RESTATEMENT, supra note 29, § 323. See also W. PROSSER, THE
LAW OF TORTS 347-48 (4th ed. 1971) (Prosser would not require that the plaintiff have
been made worse by the doctor's action. A failure to act with reasonable care by the
doctor is enough for liability according to Prosser so long as the harm could have been
avoided.).
35. King, supra note 27, at 665.
36. Russell, supra note 23, at 302.
37. King, supra note 27, at 667-69.
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a doctor owes no duty of care to a patient.38 Courts have held, however,
that the physician owes a duty to report dangerous conditions found dur-
ing an examination to the examinee, even if no duty of care had been
owed to him.39 In Betesh v. United States,40 the District Court for the
District of Columbia ruled that even when a doctor conducts an exam
primarily for the benefit of a third party, a duty is still owed to the pa-
tient.4 ' In Betesh, an Army doctor failed an applicant on his preinduction
physical because of X-ray abnormalities, which later proved to be Hodg-
kins disease.4" The court ruled that the doctor had not only a duty to
disclose any conditions actually discovered, but also a duty to conduct an
examination with reasonable care in order to discover dangerous
conditions.43
This broad interpretation of a duty can be quite difficult to satisfy in a
pre-employment examination for a professional athlete because athletes
often lie about their medical conditions." They know that failing a physi-
cal could cost them their chance in professional sports.45 In order to limit
physician liability due to an athlete's dishonesty, a physician can limit the
scope of his duty of care by expressly communicating to the examinee
that the extent of the particular relationship is to examine the patient for
certain problems, but not to discover problems that a personal physician
should discover.46 The duty to alert patients of dangerous conditions ac-
tually found during the exam would still exist.47
The duty and standard of care elements are the primary elements of
38. Russell, supra note 23, at 303.
39. See, e.g., Bealding v. Sirotta, 197 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1964); Ranier v. Frieman, 682 A.2d
1220 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996); Greenberg v. Perkins, 845 P.2d 530 (Colo. 1993).
40. 400 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1974).
41. Id. at 245-47.
42. Id. at 243.
43. Id. at 248-49.
44. ROB HUIZENGA, YOU'RE OKAY, IT'S JUST A BRUISE 76-77 (1994); Dr. Huizenga
explained that potential NFL draftees would, without exception, lie about past injuries
causing him to have to engage in "detective medicine." Id. Studies also have shown that
athletes, as a group, "significantly underestimate the disruptive effects of injuries." GAL-
LUP, supra note 15, at 92 (citing J. Crossman et al., Perceptions of Athletic Injuries by Ath-
letes, Coaches, and Medical Professionals, 71 PERCEPTUAL AND MOTOR SKILLS 848-50
(Oct. 1990)).
45. HUIZENGA, supra note 44, at 76-77. For example, professional basketball player
contracts have exceeded $100 million. Selena Roberts, N.B.A. Giving Birth to 9-Figure
Contract, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1996, at C1.
46. King, supra note 27, at 671; see e.g., Nash v. Royster, 127 S.E. 356, 359 (N.C. 1925)
(explaining that a doctor may limit the scope of his relationship with a patient at the begin-
ning of that relationship).
47. King, supra note 27, at 671.
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medicad malpractice that are at issue in cases involving professional sports
team doctors.48 When the duty element has been met, the standard of
care element next must be addressed. The standard of care for most phy-
sicians is that of a reasonably competent practitioner in the class to which
he belongs when acting under similar circumstances.4 9 If a physician rep-
resents that he is a specialist, he will be held to the higher standards of
that specialty.5"
Because team doctoring or even sports medicine was not considered a
specialty in the past, a team physician was held only to "perform with the
level of knowledge, skill, and care that is expected of a reasonably com-
petent medical practitioner under similar circumstances." 51 Although not
specifically designated a specialty or subspecialty by the AMA,5  sports
medicine now has been designated a specialty by the courts for the pur-
pose of establishing a minimal standard of care.53 In Fleicshman v. Hano-
ver Ins. Co.," the Louisiana Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the
trial court by ruling that a board certified orthopedic surgeon, who had an
interes: in sports medicine, was acceptable as an expert. Although there
is still no actual standard of care for team physicians, they certainly could
be held responsible for what other team physicians customarily55 know or
should know based upon the precedent set in Fleischman.
Given that the duty of due care is established, and the appropriate
48. Russell, supra note 23, at 301 (citing King, supra note 27, at 659-61). King explains
that there are many other issues such as causation, damages, and Good Samaritan laws that
could be important in determining liability. King, supra note 27, at 659-61.
49. Blair v. Eblen, 461 S.W. 2d 370, 373 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970).
50. Russell, supra note 23, at 305.
51. King, supra note 27, at 692.
52. GALLUP, supra note 15, at 9 (citing to the AMERICAN BOARD OF MEDICAL SPE-
CIALTIES 6-7). The American Board of Family Practice, the American Board of Internal
Medicine, and the American Board of Emergency Medicine all have created examinations
to certify physicians of their respective specialties in sports medicine. To qualify to take
the exam., physicians both must be certified by the appropriate specialty board and have
completed either a one year sports medicine fellowship associated with an accredited resi-
dency in the applicable specialty or five years of practice of which at least 20% was de-
voted to sport medicine. GALLUP, supra note 15, at 3.
Once certified, the sports medicine certification remains intact when a team doctor trav-
els out of state with his team except that he may not admit patients to hospitals. Id. at 4.
In add.:tion, team physicians may belong to one or more specialty organizations such as
the American College of Sports Medicine or the American Medical Society for Sports
Medicine. If he belongs to a specialty organization, a court could presume that the team
physician should know and follow the rules of that organization. Id. at 13.
53. Fleischman v. Hanover Ins. Co., 470 So. 2d 216, 217 (La. Ct. App. 1985).
54. l1.
55. King, supra note 27, at 688-91.
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standard of care has been breached, the question that is often raised is
why the physician is held liable and his employer is not. In Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Mason,56 the Kentucky Court of Appeals ruled that
when an employer voluntarily provides medical services for his employ-
ees, the employer is bound to exercise reasonable diligence only in the
selection of competent physicians.57 The employer was not responsible
for the subsequent negligence of the physician.58 Conversely, in Knox v.
Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp.," the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit held that because the medical staff had been employed to
further the goals of management, the doctrine of respondeat superior ap-
plied, thereby making the employer responsible for the subsequent negli-
gence of his medical staff.6" Notwithstanding the Fifth Circuit's holding
in Knox, if a team doctor maintains autonomy in the medical treatment
decision-making, he will usually be considered an independent contrac-
tor,6" and independant contractors are responsible for their own negli-
gence. For example, in Cramer v. Hoffman,62 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that because a university retained no
control over its team doctor's decisions, the doctor was an independent
contractor.63 Similarly, the State of New York was found to be relieved
from liability when doctors employed by the state were negligent in the
pre-fight examination of professional boxers, because the court ruled that
those doctors were also independent contractors.64
An exception to the general rule that a team physician is an independ-
ent contractor arises when a team physician performs a function over
which the management of a team has actual control.65 In Chuy v. Phila-
delphia Eagles Football Club,66 the team physician falsely pronounced to
the press that Chuy, a player on the team, had a fatal disease. Because
the management of the team had a contractual right to control the team
56. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Mason, 22 S.W. 2d 602 (Ky. Ct. App. 1929).
57. Morley Ben Pitt, Malpractice on the Sidelines: Developing a Standard of Care for
Team Sports Physicians, 2 COMM. & ENT. L. J. 579, 583 (1981).
58. Id.
59. Knox v. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., 158 F.2d 973 (5th Cir. 1947).
60. Id. at 975. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer is liable for the
torts of his employee even if the employer is without fault. Pitt, supra note 57, at 583 n.21.
61. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 992 (1979).
62. Cramer v. Hoffman, 390 F.2d 19 (2nd Cir. 1968).
63. Id. at 22-23.
64. Rosenzweig v. New York, 158 N.E.2d 229, 232-33 (N.Y. 1959).
65. Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 431 F. Supp 254, 265 (E.D. Pa. 1977),
affid, 595 F.2d 1265 (3d Cir. 1979).
66. Id. at 257-58.
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physician's statements released to the press, in contrast to his medical
decisions which were beyond the team's control, the court ruled that the
team was liable for the team physician's libelous speech.67 Therefore,
teams should be wary of their doctors assuming roles that go beyond the
scope of normal medical duties because, under Chuy, the team could be
responsible for non-medical activities of the team physician.
Workers' compensation statutes also are relevant in the context of
team physician liability. Most of the injuries that occur inevitably in pro-
fessioral sports are covered by state workers' compensation statutes.68
The fact that team doctors are not considered employees or ownership,
but rather independent contractors, makes the doctors uniquely suscepti-
ble to liability.69 If doctors were "co-employees" of teams along with the
players, injuries resulting from the misfeasance or nonfeasance of team
physicians would be covered under workers' compensation provisions
covering negligent harm caused by co-workers in the course of
employment.7°
III. PRESSURES ON TEAM PHYSICIANS CREATE CONFLICTS OF
INTEREST
The conflicts of interest that team doctors must face can be overwhelm-
ing. Players, 7 1 management,7 2 and the team doctor's own interests73 exert
pressure to help the team win. In the past, when team doctors have
breached their duty to patient/athletes these pressures consistently have
been the cause.74
67. Id. at 264-65.
68. See WEISTART, supra.note 61, at 1007-09.
69. Russell, supra note 23, at 310.
70. Id.
71. E.g., King, supra note 27, at 692-93; (King explains that "an athlete may prefer to
risk health for the sake of participation and success in a game."). Id. at 692.
72. E.g., Russell, supra note 23, at 317 (explaining that management can put pressure
on the team doctor in several ways which indirectly add up to a threat to his job).
73. See infra notes 119-141 and accompanying text; For example, Dr. Huizenga,
though quite critical of Raiders' management throughout his book, constantly used the
term "we" to refer to himself and the Raiders. He said, for example "we beamed going
back through the tunnel" after making it to the Super Bowl. HUIZENGA, supra note 44, at
62; "I was proud to be a black-shirted Raider outlaw." Id. at 71. This certainly shows that
Huizenya felt that he was part of the team and that he felt a sense of accomplishment in
the tea:.'s making it to the Super Bowl. He could not have "beamed" or felt pride in
winning if he had not felt the desire or pressure to win.
74. See infra notes 142-185 and accompanying text.
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A. Pressures on Team Doctors from Players/Patients Themselves
It might be assumed that management puts all of the pressure on the
team doctors to compromise medical ethics. Realistically, perhaps, the
greatest pressure, in fact, comes from the players.75 Players put pressure
on team doctors to allow them to play with dangerous injuries because
players, themselves, experience pressure from several sources to take
risks with their health. First, "machismo" cannot be underestimated as a
pressure effecting athletes.76 Defined as an exaggerated masculinity,77
machismo is a prevalent feature in professional team sports.78 Tim
Green, a former player in the National Football League ("NFL"), ex-
plained that NFL players experience strong pressure to show toughness.
Taking the needle7 9 is something NFL players are proud to have
done. It is a badge of honor, not unlike the military's Purple
Heart. It means you were in the middle of the action and took a
hit. Taking the needle in the NFL also lets everyone know that
you'd do anything to play the game. It demonstrates the com-
plete disregard for one's well-being that is admired in the NFL
.... It is a certain sign of toughness and lets everyone know that
that player can be counted on to "do whatever it takes."8 °
Second, players face pressure from management to play with inju-
ries.8 Coaches often encourage the macho image and may view the phy-
sicians with suspicion.8" Coaches are under great pressure to win.
Accordingly, this translates into coaches putting pressure on their players
to play when injured.83 Some players avoid treatment altogether for fear
that a coach would cut or replace them if the coach knew that they were
75. See generally, Pitt, supra note 57, at 581.
76. Pitt, supra note 57, at 588.
77. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 697 (10th ed. 1993).
78. Pitt, supra note 57, at 588.
79. The "needle" is a pain numbing shot of Xylocaine that often allows an athlete to
play with an injury. GREEN, supra note 1, at 125. For an explanation of Xylocaine see
PHYSICIANS DESK REFERENCE ("PDR") 562-65 (1997).
80. GREEN, supra note 1, at 125; Green gives an example of such machismo. He ex-
plained that his teammate's, Bret Clark's, taking shot after shot of Xylocane for an injured
knee in order to play, was admirable. Id. at 126-28; "He took the needle every week. He
was that tough. Everyone marveled at the pain and obvious physical damage this man
endured in the name of winning. He was a team player, an example to us all." Id. at 126-
28; Green was unsure if Clark was despondent or proud of his choice that left him dam-
aged for life. Id. at 129.
81. E.g., Pitt, supra note 57, at 588.
82. Pitt, supra note 57, at 586-88.
83. John Underwood, Punishment is a Crime, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 28, 1978 at
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injured.84 Dr. Rob Huizenga, a former team physician for the Los Ange-
les Raiders, and past president of the NFL Physicians Society, noted that
"if you didn't play hurt, you risked going on [Raider Owner] Al Davis's
[expletive] list."85 He went on to say that such a reputation could end a
player's chances of playing for that specific team and could ruin his
chances of being traded or picked up by another team.86 A former Na-
tional Basketball Association ("NBA") player stated that "If [manage-
ment] think[s] that you're not willing to play with a certain amount of
pain, they can no longer use your services.... They'll find someone else
willing to take the [pain numbing] shots and play hurt."87
Pee:r pressure also can play a part in an athlete's desire to return from
injury prematurely.88 A former NFL trainer said, "[t]here's tremendous
peer pressure to play with pain in this league ... [those who] played in a
great deal of pain... were respected and admired for doing it."89 On the
other hand, a player who is reluctant to play with an injury can be ridi-
culed by teammates.9 °
The strongest pressure on athletes is most likely the threat of replace-
ment. A former NFL team physician stated:
There was no job security; one bad game and they could be
gone. There was always somebody on your shoulder. The vets
had to hold off the rookies, and the young guys had to fight for
p]aying time to prove their worth. When you did play, you were
almost always going to end up playing hurt.9 '
Of course, the desire to play is motivated by economic considerations as
well as a love for the game.
Other factors also pressure players to want to play. The media is one
source of such pressure. For example, NFL commentator and former
84. Gerald Eskenazi, Michaels Angered by Todd and Jet Doctor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11,
1977 at A25; (Walt Michaels, former coach of the New York Jets, used to peek into the
trainer'; room to see who was receiving treatment. Some players avoided the trainer's
room for fear of being seen by Michaels.). Id.
85. HUiZENGA, supra note 44, at 120.
86. Id.
87. Jeffrey Mayer, Playing with Pain, L.A. TiMEs, Aug. 29, 1978, at. See generally,
supra nate 81.
88. E.g., Pitt, supra note 57, at 589.
89. Mayer, supra note 88, at 1; supra note 81.
90. Pitt, supra note 57, at 589; (For example, Fred Patek, a former Kansas City Royals
shortstop, was told to stop feeling sorry for himself and to start playing by Royals team-
mates who were concerned about their chances of winning their divisional race but were
not aware of the extent of his injuries.). Id.
91. HUIZENGA, supra note 44, at 120.
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player, John Riggins, called Redskins wide receiver, Michael Westbrook,
a "punk" on his local television broadcast because Westbrook missed sev-
eral games due to injuries.92 Westbrook later returned to play too
quickly from a knee ligament tear and was re-injured.93 Additionally,
some doctors even have asserted that players suffer from "Funktionlust,"
the love of doing a thing, which causes them to want to play even when it
could be potentially harmful.94
Obviously, some or all of these self-induced pressures result in a
player's strong desire to play whether injured or not.95 Some players may
even lie to a doctor in order to get a chance to play.96 The result is that:
Players beg doctors for needles [that numb] and drugs that re-
duce the swelling and pain .... They'll do almost anything hu-
manly possible to get back on the field. Only the elite players
can afford to be immune from this diseased way of thinking and
even most of them would do the same thing.97
92. Dave Sell, A Work in Progress: Martial Arts Accent Westbrook's Efforts, WASH.
POST, Oct. 23, 1996, at C1. Contributing to Riggins' assessment of Westbrook is the fact
that Westbrook is flashy, drives a Lamborghini sports car and did not produce on the foot-
ball field due to a string of injuries. Dave Sell, Westbrook Out 3-6 Weeks with Knee Injury;
Redskins' Receiver Won't Need Surgery for Ligament Tear, WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1996, at
D1.
93. Richard Justice, Monk-Like Westbrook is Now Imitating Art, WASH. POST, Feb. 20,
1997, at El (explaining that Westbrook played with a partial ligament tear because his
toughness had been questioned and tore the ligament completely, but still finished the
game). Westbrook's status was listed as "day to day" in local newspapers despite the fact
that doctors told the Redskins that Westbrook would have to miss four weeks of playing
time. Id. This also demonstrates one way a team can use the media to motivate a player to
play when injured.
94. King, supra note 27 at 693 (explaining the theory of Conrad Lopez which was
further examined in Crile, The Surgeon's Dilemma, HARPER'S, May 1975, at 38).
95. GREEN, supra note 9, at 215; Green, a former NFL football player, believes that
doctors do not coerce injured football players on to the field of play. He asserts that foot-
ball players:
have been conveniently conditioned their entire lives to play with pain and put
their bodies at risk. Players beg for needles that numb and drugs that reduce
swelling or pain. Go ahead and treat them like a race horse or a fighting pit bull.
They'll do almost anything possible to get out onto the field.
Id.
96. HUIZENGA, supra note 3, at 76-77 (explaining that potential draftees are never
honest about their medical histories which result in team doctors engaging in "detective
medicine").
97. GREEN, supra note 9, at 215-216; Studies have demonstrated that athletes signifi-
cantly underestimate the extent of their injuries. GALLUP, supra note 15, at 92 (citing J.
Crossman, J. Jamieson, & K. Hume, Perceptions of Athletic Injuries by Athletes, Coaches,
and Medical Professionals, 71 PERCEPTUAL MOTOR SKILLS, 848-50 (Oct., 1990)). The fact
that players may underestimate their injuries along with their desire to take risks can be a
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B. Pressures on Team Doctors from Management
Management, to whom the team doctor owes a contractual obligation,
can exert real pressure upon team doctors to compromise medical ethical
standards.98 Management can exert this pressure indirectly or directly
through pressuring the athletes who, in turn, will pressure the team doc-
tors,99 through subtle questioning of a physician's competence, °° through
immoral guidelines set for the physician,' 0 ' or through scrutiny in inter-
views given to the media.'0 2 Pressure by management contains the im-
plicit threat that the physician will be replaced if he does not support
management's policies."0 3 For example, doctors might be told to with-
hold important medical information from the players. One team doctor
explained the policy of an NFL football team to a new team doctor by
saying that information must be kept from the players especially when it
involves the length of time necessary for recovery:
Just be careful not to tell the players anything... You've got to
treat them differently from your office patients. You tell them
two weeks and their mind locks into that. And then what if
they're ready in a week? They'll be nervous that they're not
fully healed. They won't be mentally ready to play. Never put a
date in their head. °4
Other team instructions or policies may force doctors to compromise
their medical standards of treatment as well. Management may en-
courage a doctor to perform a less serious procedure than what is really
necessary with a faster recovery period to minimize an athlete's time out
dangerous combination. For example, an athlete may only have a mild headache after a
concussion. He may believe that he is capable of playing. However, he would be at great
risk of sccond impact syndrome which causes severe brain injury or death. GALLUP, supra
note 15, at 92, 114. One team doctor warns, "I'm not sure if [athletes are] willing to not
play when they have a concussion and its the Super Bowl." Pollack, supra note 6, at 13.
98. See Russell, supra note 23, at 317; One NFL front office executive said that doc-
tors feel pressure to get a player back from injury before he is ready 50% of the time. He
said that when coaches perceive that the doctor is being too cautious, a coach might ap-
proach a doctor and say, "Let's go. Let's get them to play." Pollack, supra note 6, at 11.
99. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
100. Russell, supra note 23, at 317.
101. See HUIZENGA, supra note 44, at 58 (withholding information from players con-
cerning their own health); Id. at 124 (attempting to never use stretchers); Id. at 142 (faking
injuries to get onto the injured reserve list).
102. Eskanazi, supra note 84, at A25.
103. Russell, supra note 23, at 317; A former player stated that when management
applies pressure upon the team physician, the doctor usually "folds." "The ones that don't
fold end up being fired." Pollack, supra note 6, at 12.
104. HIUIZENGA, supra note 44, at 58.
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of action,' °5 or management may encourage a team physician not to in-
vestigate an injury fully.10 6 Management may believe that certain situa-
tions, such as witnessing a severely injured teammate on the field of play,
can disturb the morale of the team.1" 7 Such a policy may cause the team
doctor to be more reckless, for example, when examining neck injuries of
injured players while they are still on the field.1"8 Another policy of man-
agement may be to have the team physician overlook health problems
that are unrelated to performance on the athletic field.' 0 9 In one situa-
tion where a doctor alerted an athlete of a possibly cancerous growth, he
was admonished by the management. Management said that once the
team is "officially" aware of a medical condition, the team must attend to
it.11
0
Ironically, it is sometimes to management's advantage to have its doc-
tor overestimate the extent of an injury or even to be part of a lie regard-
ing an injury to a player."' For example, in the NFL, a player can be put
on an injured reserve list whereby he cannot play in any games, but can
practice with the team' 1 allowing teams to continue to keep many young
"injured" players with the hope of grooming them for the future." 3
105. See Pollack, supra note 6, at 11. Drew Rosenhaus, an agent, asserted that he repre-
sented players who were supposed to have reconstructive surgery, but were given lesser
procedures so as to minimize a player's time out of action. Id.
106. Id. Agent Gary Wichert stated that a Magnetic Resonance Imaging Photograph
("MRI") of his client's injured ankle was not taken because the head coach ordered the
doctor not to take the MRI. Id.
107. See HUIZENGA, supra note 44, at 124. One team doctor explained that the owner,
"[did not] like stretchers. The team gets demoralized and plays less aggressively when they
see a teammate getting carted off the field on a stretcher." Id.
108. HUIZENGA, supra note 44, at 123-24; Dr. Huizenga explained that he witnessed
Dr. Rosenfeld move the neck of Kenny King, a Los Angeles Raider football player, when
neither doctor had ruled out the possibility of a neck fracture. According to Dr. Huizenga,
moving a fractured neck can lead to permanent paralysis. Id. According to the guidelines
of the American College of Sports Medicine, a patient with a possible neck injury should
have his neck immobilized until cervical spine X-rays are taken. ACSM, supra note 16, at
149-51.
109. See Ron Pollack, Ethics Issue is not Limited to Football, PRO FOOTBALL WKLY,
Nov. 10, 1996, at 11.
110. Id.
111. HUIZENGA, supra note 44, at 141 (describing how the team openly conspired to
force a player to fake an injury). Team physicians may also be forced to lie to the public by
underestimating a player's injury. An agent asserted that, because of orders by the head
coach, a team physician told the press that a player would miss only two weeks of action
when, in actuality, the player should have missed the season. Two neutral doctors, who
examined the athlete, concurred with the agent. Pollack, supra note 6, at 11.
112. HUIZENGA, supra note 44, at 141.
113. Id. at 141-42.
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Team physicians are often a party to the deception. Some team physi-
cians have even coached players on how to feign injury during physical
exams by independent doctors."
14
Since the management of professional sports teams is constantly in the
public eye, management is in the position to influence its team doctors
through the media. 1 5 For example, former New York Jets head coach,
Walt Michaels, expressed his anger to reporters that his team's doctor
admitted Richard Todd, the team's starting quarterback, to a local hospi-
tal wit:hout first obtaining the permission of the coaching staff." 6
Michaels even attempted to fine the doctor for doing so." 7 Michaels
learned of Todd's hospitalization through the media and chose to get
back alt the doctor by berating him in the media." 8 This type of situation
rarely occurs, as evidenced by the datedness of the Michaels example,
because management usually can just as easily fire the team physician as
disparage him in the media, but the possibility always exists.
C. Self-Pressures of Team Doctors
Less apparent and frequently underestimated are the self-imposed
pressures that a doctor often faces. These pressures are a result of two
factors. First, team doctors routinely believe or want to believe that they
are part of the team and, therefore, may experience the pressure to sacri-
fice a player's health for the sake of team success." 9 Second, a team
doctor may put undo pressure on himself to please management so he
can keep his position due to the many benefits he receives from his status
as a professional sports team doctor.
12 0
Most sports physicians chose this area of work because they are fans
and enjoy competitive sports.' 2 ' Teams often allow their doctors to par-
ticipato in team camaraderie, which contributes to the doctors' impres-
sions that they are part of the teams.' Unlike most doctor-patient
114. i'd. at 142.




119. See infra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 124-36 and accompanying text.
121. See generally, Thomas H. Murry, Divided Loyalties in Sports Medicine, THE PHYSI-
CIAN AND SPORTS MEDICINE, Aug. 1984, at 136 (stating that team physicians often want the
team to -win as badly as managment does).
122. E~.g., HUIZENGA, supra note 44, at 71 (stating, "I was proud to be a black-shirted
Raider outlaw.").
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relationships, it is not uncommon for the team doctor to go to movies
with players, 2 3 join players in card games,124 or "party" with the players
at either official 125 or unofficial126 team functions. Team physicians have
received game balls in front of the entire team for exemplary perform-
ances during games.1 27 The team mentality can cause a doctor to experi-
ence the same emotional highs and lows that come from winning and
losing games that players and coaches experience.
One doctor explained after a playoff game loss:
We sat in solemn silence, heads hung, with that helpless, hope-
less knot in the pit of the stomach. I could remember feeling
pretty despondent after tough wrestling losses in college, but I
had no idea I'd feel this bad now. I was only the doctor, but I
had an incredible urge to punch the wall.
128
After winning the Super Bowl, the same doctor said "We sprayed and
gulped champagne with glee," and that he "was proud to be a black-
shirted Raider outlaw.,
129
A doctor also may put pressure on himself to help the team win, first
and foremost, because the position of team doctor has many perks.
130
The pay that team doctors receive is insignificant compared to these extra
benefits. 131 One team doctor estimated that his salary during the 1980's
amounted to about eight dollars per hour.1 32 Most recently, some doc-
tors actually have paid teams up to one million dollars for the rights to
take care of their players. 133 Jay Pearce, a member of a group of doctors
for the Orlando Magic, explained that it makes economic sense to pay to
be the team's doctors. He said, "[a] lot of [orthopedic surgeons] would be
willing to be sponsors .... We want the world to know that we do take
care of the team. '1 34 Being connected to the local sports team can give a
123. E.g., id. at 36 (The team physician went with players on the team "movie bus" to
see tough-guy movies).
124. Id. at 44-45.
125. Id. at 104-05 (Team doctor was invited to the rookie sponsored training camp team
party where he was considered a "rookie.").
126. Id. at 96 (The team physician spoke of the times he spent with the players socially
and that the players never let him pay for a bar bill.).
127. HUIZENGA, supra note 44 at 149, 204-05.
128. Id. at 133.
129. Id. at 71.
130. See Joseph Nocera, Bitter Medicine, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 6, 1995 at 82.
131. Id.
132. HUIZENGA, supra note 44, at 59.
133. Nocera, supra note 130, at 84.
134. Lester Munson, Bitter Medicine, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 6, 1995, at 84.
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doctor a great amount of visibility.'35 When a child tears a knee ligament
playing high school football or field hockey or simply falls off his bicycle
and breaks his leg, concerned parents will want the best doctor, and who
would be better than the team doctor of the local professional team?
136
For a team internist, who may not benefit as much as an orthopedic
surgeon could from the exposure, 37 there are also many potential bene-
fits. Many athletes continue to see a team internist as their private doctor
after they retire, 38 which gives the doctor a lucrative patient base be-
cause -x-athletes invariably have health problems. Another potential
benefit is a share of the team's playoff bonus money. 139 For a team inter-
nist, a -playoff bonus share could triple his salary.14° Certainly, this could
raise questions about bonus money tipping the balance of a doctor's in-
terest in favor of winning in the short term over the long term health of a
player. Of course, who would not want a seat right on the sideline, a free
trip to the Super Bowl or the World Series, or a championship ring that
may be given to the winning team's doctor?.4 All of these extra benefits
add to the weight of the pressures to win that team doctors experience,
and ultimately may compromise patient care.
IV. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST CREATE EXPOSURE TO TORT LIABILITY
The strong pressures creating conflicts of interest for the team physi-
cians may cause a team physician to make mistakes in medical judgement.
Recently, Ron Morris of the NFL's Chicago Bears was awarded 5.3 mil-
lion dollars by a jury because his team's doctor negligently performed a
135. Nocera, supra note 130, at 82 (noting that one of the benefits an orthopedic sur-
geon for the Boston Red sox received was "a kind of visibility that orthopedic surgeons can
only dream about").
136. .d. See also HUIZENGA, supra note 44, at 74-75.
137. HUIZENGA, supra note 44, at 74-75 (explaining that people are more likely to go to
a team crthopedist than a team internist because when someone has an orthopedic injury,
the NFL. orthopedist appears to be the best doctor, but if "your mother had a stroke or
developed diabetes, you wouldn't instictively run to the nearest NFL city and look up the
team internist").
138. Id. at 153 (stating that many veteran players would continue to see a team physi-
cian after retiring from athletics). However, Kevin Glover of the NFL's Detroit Lions said,
"I don't think that the doctors really have a whole lot of loyalty to the players. It's not like
the players are going to be in contact with these doctors once [players] retire." Pollack,
supra note 6, at 10.
139. IHtIZENGA, supra note 44, at 70. Dr. Huizenga explained that though playoff bo-
nus money was fairly insignificant to the players, a playoff share could match, double, or
even triple the salaries of many of the staff including the team internist. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 59.
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routine knee procedure. 142 The doctor was so desperate to retain his po-
sition as team doctor that he erased the videotape of the operation.
143
Another example of management pressure causing a team doctor to
make a medical mistake involved Glenn Seabrooke, a prospect of the
National Hockey League's("NHL") Philadelphia Flyers,' 4 who had in-
jured his shoulder during a game. 145 At trial, memos were introduced into
evidence from the team medical staff to Flyer management wherein the
medical staff promised that they would be "beating on Seabrooke all
summer."' 6 They pushed Seabrooke so hard that he developed dead
arm syndrome which left his shoulder and arm useless and in constant
pain for life."47 A jury awarded Seabrooke 5.5 million dollars." 8
An extreme example of the intense pressure to win leading to a medi-
cal mistake in judgment involved Houston Ridge, a lineman for the
NFL's San Diego Chargers. After suffering a hip injury, Ridge was given
speed and phenobarbital and sent back into a game. 149 Ridge aggravated
the injury by fracturing his hip during the game, but later said that he was
so high on amphetamines that he did not realize he had broken his hip. 5 °
The injury ended his career and he settled his case out of court.'
51
The aforementioned cases are extreme, and relatively rare, examples of
medical malpractice. It takes much more action on the part of a physi-
cian to hurt a player through poorly performed treatment than it does to
expose a player to a treatment without making him aware of the risks.
Players constantly are being treated. It can be quite easy to send a player
back into action without having first informed him of the risks of playing
after a specific treatment. Therefore, when conflicts of interest that team
physicians face cause them to make tortious mistakes, those mistakes usu-
ally take the form of either a failure to obtain informed consent from the
patient or an intentional fraudulent concealment of information.'
5 2
Informed consent is a legal doctrine that requires a physician to obtain
142. Nocera, supra note 130, at 80-81.
143. Id.




148. Nocera, supra note 130, at 81.
149. Pitt, supra note 57, at 597. For a description of phenobarbital, see PDR, supra note
80, at 2234-35.
150. Pitt, supra note 57, at 597.
151. Id. See also Thomas H. Murry, Divided Loyalties in Sports Medicine, PHYSICIAN &
SPORTS MEDICINE, Aug. 1984, at 136.
152. ACSM, supra note 16, at 121.
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permission from his patient before using any diagnostic procedures or
rendering any treatment. 153 The American College of Sports Medicine
establishes no guidelines for determining what constitutes adequate or
truly informed consent.154 Generally, however, what the team physician
is required to disclose before administering care is the diagnosis, the na-
ture and purpose of the proposed treatment, the risks and consequences
of that treatment, and the prognosis of alternative treatments including
non-treatment.' 55 A patient/athlete must understand to what he is con-
senting; without understanding, no consent exists.
156
One of the first cases involving informed consent in professional team
sports concerned a member of the NFL Hall of Fame, former Chicago
Bear linebacker, Dick Butkus.'57 Butkus, who had a chronic knee injury,
was treated with cortisone on a weekly basis for four years. 5 ' He alleged
that he was never told how serious his injuries were and that he would
have been fined or suspended if he had refused to play.1 59 His case was
settled out of court.1
60
Perhaps the best known case involved former NBA star, Bill Walton.16'
Walton alleged that the team doctors of the Portland Trailblazers, where
he played, never informed him of the lasting damage being done to his
feet while they were numbed by painkillers.' 61 Walton asserted that his
subsequent bone fracture would not have occurred if not for injections of
Xylocaine, Marcaine, and Decadron.163 This case clearly demonstates the
pressures on players because, early in his career, Walton had refused to
take painkilling drugs. 64 The press, the fans, team officials, and even
some of his teammates began to call him a "malingerer.' ' 165 The pressure
153. GALLUP, supra note 15, at 40.
154. A.CSM, supra note 16, at 122. The guidelines only say that possible rather than
probable risks should be disclosed and legal advisors should be consulted. Id.
155. GALLUP, supra note 15, at 40.
156. Id. at 41. For example, information provided must be in layman's terms according
to what tLe patient would want to know. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780-82 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).
157. Murry, supra note 151, at 136.
158. Russell, supra note 23, at 321.
159. Murry, supra note 151, at 136.
160. Id.
161. Russell, supra note 23, at 320.
162. Nocera, supra note 130, at 84.
163. Russell, supra note 23, at 320. See also John Papanek, Off on a Wronged Foot,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 21, 1978, at 20. For a description of Marcaine and its effects,
see PDR, supra note 80, at 2446-49. For a description of Decadron, see id. at 1676-88.
164. Papanek, supra note 163, at 20.
165. I.
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to win finally caused Walton to begin taking shots in his foot.'6 6 His suit
also was settled out of court.
1 67
The doctrine of informed consent is not limited to the area of numbing
injections. Kenny Easely of the NFL's Seattle Seahawks sued his former
team doctors for allowing large doses of over-the-counter medication to
be available in an open bin without a doctor's supervision or warning.168
He claimed that this medication aggravated a later diagnosed kidney
problem. 169 He too settled out of court.' 70 Other cases have included situ-
ations where players were deceptively given drugs,' 7 ' or not made aware
of the risks of using drugs.1
71
The first major case that changed and established the rules for team
doctors was Krueger v. San Francisco 49ers.1 73 Charles Krueger, the
plaintiff and a former NFL player, alleged that the team physicians had
gone beyond mere lack of informed consent to intentionally and fraudu-
lently concealling 74 meaningful information when treating him.' 75 Krue-
ger had been given "Kepplemann treatments," injections of novocain and
cortisone, in his knee on a regular basis without ever being told that such
treatments could possibly rupture tendons, weaken joints and cartilage,
and destroy capillaries and blood vessels. 1 76 The court held that a physi-
cian cannot avoid responsibility simply by claiming that information was
not withheld,' 77 and that this concealment amounted to fraud.178 One
team doctor described the true effect of the ruling:
If a doctor gave knee injections and the player understood the
risks and benefits and agreed, that would be good medicine. If a
166. Id. at 21-22.
167. Nocera, supra note 130, at 84.
168. HUiZENGA, supra note 44, at 238.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Pitt, supra note 57, at 595. Ken Gray of the St. Louis football Cardinals al-
leged that he was deceptively given drugs which made him perform more violently. Id.
172. Pitt, supra note 57 at 594. In Mendenhall v. Oakland Raiders, the player alleged
that he was given amphetamines without being told the risks involved. No. 441-241 (Cal.
Super. Ct., Alameda County, Sept. 28, 1973).
173. 234 Cal. Rptr. 579 (1987).
174. The elements of an action for fraudulent concealment (fraud or deceit) are a mis-
representation or suppression of a material fact, knowledge of any falsity, intent to induce
reliance, actual and justifiable reliance, and resulting damages. Muraoka v. Budget Rent-
a-Car, 160 Cal. App. 3d 107, 119 (1984).
175. Krueger, 234 Cal. Rptr. at 582-83.
176. Id. at 581.
177. Id. at 583.
178. Id.
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doctor gave knee injections, explained the risks and benefits, but
mistakenly stuck the needle into the cartilage and damaged it,
that would be malpractice. If a doctor, however, recommended
knee injections and knowingly withheld possible future risks
from the player, or went on giving injections when complica-
tions became apparent, that would be fraud. Your basic doctor's
malpractice insurance does not cover fraud. So in this type of
judgment, the doctor pays with his car, his house, his wife, his
firstborn kid, whatever.
179
A recent unpublished case reinforces the doctrine of fraudulent con-
cealment established in Krueger. More importantly though, a team doc-
tor's financial interest in the team was argued to be a conflict of interest,
which explained why the standard of care was breached.' ° In Barrett v.
Pappas., the team doctor of Major League Baseball's ("MLB") Boston
Red Sox, removed part of the ruptured anterior cruciate ligament of Red
Sox second baseman, Marty Barrett. Dr. Pappas told Barrett and the
press, however, that Barrett had suffered only some torn cartilage.
181
Pappas owned five percent of the team' 82 and was privy to management's
long teim decision not to keep Barrett.183 Barrett's attorney argued that
because Pappas was part of management, there was a clear conflict of
interest between Pappas' obvious financial stake in the team and the best
interests of his patient.
As stated earlier, all team doctors have some financial interest in the
teams fcr which they work.184 Based upon the arguments presented in
Barrett, proving a financial interest in the team's success may be strong
evidence that a team doctor is predisposed to breaching his duty of care
to his patients. A recent trend in professional sports is to have the team
physicians sponsor teams or become partners in the organizations. 185 The
decision. in Barrett could expose these physicians to quite damaging and
expensive liability.
179. HUIZENGA, supra note 44, at 195.
180. Nocera, supra note 130, at 87.
181. Id. at 74, 80.
182. Id. at 82.
183. Ia. at 88.
184. See notes 129-40 infra and accompanying text.
185. Hypocritic Oath, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 8, 1995, at 12; Lester Munson, Fast
Operators., SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 6, 1995, at 84. Under the informed consent doc-
trine, a physician must disclose his personal and financial interests when treating a patient.
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 129, 793 P.2d 479, 483 (1990); but cf.
Rodwin, supra note 2, at 214-16.
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V. ANALYSIS OF POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
When physicians have interests in anything other than their patients,
conflicts become a real possibility. The more conflicts of interest, the
more the potential exists for the doctor to harm the patient and to incur
liability. 186 It seems that many interested parties already believe that
team physicians will favor their employers over their patients. For exam-
ple, when asked who they thought team physicians will favor in a conflict,
96.2% of NFL agents surveyed stated that the physicians will favor man-
agement.1 8 7 Players themselves are convinced that doctors favor man-
agement. An NFL player who was pressed to return early from injuries
explained:
It's tough being a team doctor. They're an extension of the
coaching staff. Sometimes they don't want to be in the position
they're in, but they don't have a choice. What I learned is a lot
of control is out of their hands. They can't afford to be as caring
as you'd like them to be because everybody has got to eat. 88
The perception that team physicians are controlled by management is
correct according to Richard Berthelsen, the general counsel for the Na-
tional Football League Players Association. He remarked that team doc-
tors "almost invariably side against players in arbitration hearings
claiming that players' injuries are not related to football." '18 9
What should be done? Dr. David Fischer, medical director for the
NFL's Minnesota Vikings, suggests that no problem exists. He asserts
that "there's no incentive for me to jeopardize a player's health. My posi-
tion and my credibility and my reputation ultimately depend on being a
good doctor."' 19 0 However, as stated earlier, player health has been jeop-
ardized in the past and, most likely, will continue to be jeopardized. Ad-
ditionally, Dr. Fischer and other team physicians should realize that,
potentially, unhappy management could fire them for performing their
duties with the level of accepted caution required for normal patient care.
186. See HUIZENGA, supra note 44, at 209; For example, if because of his status, a team
doctor learns that an opposing team's player will be suspended for a violation of the league
drug policy before an upcoming game, the desire to tell his team's coach becomes tremen-
dous. Id.
187. Pollack, supra note 6, at 10. When agents were asked how often team doctors feel
pressure to rush a player back from injury before he is ready to play, 19.2% voted "all of
the time"; 26.9% voted "three-quarters of the time"; 42.3% voted "half of the time";
11.5% voted "one quarter of the time"; 0.0% voted "never". Id.
188. Id. at 12.
189. Nocera, supra note 131, at 84.
190. Pollack, supra note 6, at 10.
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Moreover, the negative publicity that could result from being fired by a
professional sports team could be almost as devastating to his reputation
as a specialist as providing substandard care.
There are several possible solutions to reduce the conflicts affecting
team doctors. One solution is for team doctors to get tough with their
employers. Experts have suggested that doctors must convince manage-
ment that the decisions of the team doctor are final,19' or make it clear to
management that medical services are not associated with winning.' 92
These -are naive proposals. The reality is that management can replace
the team doctor at any time, and there will be several others ready to
replace him. Team doctors are in no position to make demands. Some
doctors pay millions of dollars' 93 just for the right to serve as team doc-
tors because of the extra benefits the position holds. Consequently,
teams do not have much difficulty finding replacements for demanding
doctors.
The only solutions to possibly compromised medical care that will work
are those that reduce the many pressures to win that a team doctor exper-
iences. When considering the pressures applied by the players, a team
doctor must decide if he should attend to the players' medical needs or
honor their choices.' 9 4 If a doctor believes that a player is capable of
making the decisions, he simply has to inform the player satisfactorily of
all of the risks of any particular treatment and its alternatives. The real
probler of informed consent arises not during practice or in the trainer's
room, but during certain "heat of battle" situations. The difficult dilem-
mas of game time decision-making could be eliminated if the doctor were
to inform the players of certain treatments that they possibly could re-
ceive during a game and ask them to which treatments they would con-
sent ard to which will they not consent before the situation arises.
Certainly, a very short written questionnaire/waiver could be kept for
each player so that the physician could have instant access to the wishes
of a player regardless of what he says during a game. Athletes are more in
touch with their bodies and are better able to make determinations about
the risks of participation than a non-athlete or even a physician.' 95
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Therefore, if the athlete is informed, he should make his own decisions,
but at a time of unquestionable lucidity. The doctor must address the
player's needs instead of the player's wishes and should stop the athlete
from participating only when there are significant risks of harm from par-
ticipation.'96 These risks must be so great, such as paralysis or death, that
the decision should be taken out of the patient/athlete's hands. Other-
wise, the physician only should make the athlete's decision for him when
the athlete is not lucid.197
One way to decrease the pressure on team physicians to win is to pro-
hibit the team doctor from acting as part of the team. He should not
socialize with the players or the management. He should not receive a
playoff share or a championship ring. He only should see the players on a
professional level. He should not participate in team trickery such as fak-
ing injuries to get players on the injured reserve list or to stop the game
clock.' 98 Only then can the doctor make sound decisions regarding what
is best for a player's health rather than what treatment will best enable
the team to win.
Most importantly, however, the economic incentives for being a team
doctor must be controlled. One solution would make a physician the
league's employee.' 99 Physicians would have some autonomy and would
rotate cities every few years to minimize partisanship to one team. °°
This may work to the extent that some partisanship will be eliminated.
However, top doctors will not find this attractive because the constant
moving will not allow them to maintain a practice outside of team doctor-
ing. These rotating doctors, therefore, would become subjected to the
whims of the league even more so than team doctors are now subject to
the whims of management because, at least, team doctors today have pri-
vate practices upon which they may fall back.
One agent, Drew Rosenhaus, suggests eliminating the "team" doctor
completely so that management has no contact with or control over the
team doctor whatsoever.20 ' This could work because some sports do not
need a team doctor. In basketball and baseball, for example, no team
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197. Id. One could assert that "heat of battle" thoughts are not lucid thoughts. Id. at
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201. Ron Pollack, A Possible Solution to the Problem, PRo FOOTBALL WKLY, Nov. 10,
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doctor is necessary. Upon injury in these sports, management could pro-
vide the players with a list of several specialists from which they could
choose. A group of rotating doctors could take turns sitting in at games
in case of an emergency. No one publicly could claim to be the team
doctor, and all doctors could serve a fixed term on the list. In football,
however, there are so many severe injuries and players that there must be
at least one doctor at every game and practice.2" 2 A diverse group of
doctors could still treat an NFL team so long as the game day doctor was
adequately informed of the special needs of certain players. These doc-
tors should be paid, certified, and hired by the league or the players'
union °2 0 3 and supervised by an impartial board2 4 so that team camarade-
rie, loyalty, and economic pressures are kept to a minimum.
Furthermore, all professional sports leagues should certify their own
team doctors. The particular athletes for each sport usually have similar
problems to other athletes throughout their sport, but different problems
than athletes involved in other sports. A general sports medicine interest
is not sufficient to treat professional athletes. For example, knowing how
to cool down an overheated 330 pound lineman will not translate into
knowing how to treat a pitcher with a sore shoulder.
Players also should be encouraged to take a more active role in their
medical care. More players need to request second opinions.20 5 Players
have a right to these opinions under their collective bargaining agree-
ments, and teams are required to pay for them.20 6 However, players are
scared that the team will look down upon them and the medical staff will
refuse future treatment if a second opinion is sought.20 7 Consequently,
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team doctors should encourage these second opinions for the health of
the players and to limit their own potential liability.
No case yet has set the standard of care for professional team physi-
cians. Therefore, doctors should be wary of their conflicts of interest.
The more conflicts of interest that exist, the more likely that a jury will
find that the doctor had a reason to breach the standard of care. The
potential expansion of the Barrett decision to all doctors who have any
economic interest in teams should give pause to anyone considering being
a team doctor. One must weigh the potential for tremendous liability
against the benefits that come from being associated with a team. Cer-
tainly, at a minimum, it will discourage well informed team doctors from
engaging in any ownership activities.
VI. CONCLUSION
A team doctor is held to the standard of care of a specialist. Yet, be-
cause no AMA guidelines exist, this standard is not certain. Regardless
of the specific standard of care, a variety of pressures act as incentives for
team doctors to breach the standard. The players pressure team doctors
to disregard the standard of care so that players can get back on the field
quickly. The team doctor can be influenced by management, which is
concerned about the success of the team, through the tacit threat that he
can be replaced at any time if he coddles the players. Most importantly,
the team doctor experiences self-imposed pressure. Most team doctors
are fans who want their teams to win. They socialize with the players and
management, and they are the envy of their friends as a result of this
access. A large amount of their business can be a direct result of their
exposure from and association with the team. Bad exposure resulting
from being dismissed from the team could damage business. Addition-
ally, what doctor wants to be the one to force the quarterback to miss the
Super Bowl? Who wants to be the villain that ruined the hometown's
chance at glory? Who would not want to be a part of that glory with a
Super Bowl ring to prove it?
So many conflicts and potential conflicts of interest push the team doc-
tor away from cautious medicine. If he is negligent, however, he alone
will have to pay the damages, and if he conceals information, his malprac-
tice insurance may not cover those damages. Yet, doctors are paying mil-
lions for the opportunity to be a team doctor. Some policies, if
implemented, can help shield the team doctor from liability, but conflicts
of interest are almost inherent in the job description of a professional
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sports team physician. Team physicians and their attorneys must be
aware of these conflicts of interest because the sweetness of a champion-
ship can be soured quickly and easily by expensive tort litigation.
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